The
author of this article, Soumitra Ghosh, is an activist working among forest
communities in the area. This brief paper, based mainly on personal experiences
gained in past one decade of working among the project-affected
communities, attempts to trace a narrative
of development, environment and people that has now become typical in the
Himalayan region.
The gorge of the glacial Teesta river in
sub-Himalayan West Bengal has recently witnessed large-scale construction
activities: National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), in collaboration
with West Bengal Government are building two ‘low’ dams(Teesta Low Dam Project,
TLDP-III and IV). These are on the North Bengal part of the river. The Sikkim
part already has several, and more coming up. The project, mired in
controversies since its start, remained thoroughly undemocratic and illegal:
gross violation of the laws of the land and the project authorities’ arrogant
disregard for possible environmental fall-outs marked it. Dissent of
communities living in the scattered forest villages inside the gorge, and
villages in higher valleys were smothered first with promises of jobs and later
repeatedly, with coercion, in active connivance with major political parties of
the region. The work which started in 2003 is far from complete, but one unit
of TLDP-III has reportedly been commissioned in December 2012. Which means that
the river is no longer flowing in an approximately 12 Kilometre long stretch along
National Highway 31A that goes to Sikkim. More than 400 families in three
forest villages living in the gorge, mostly uncompensated and ignored, now
await submergence of their homes, wayside shops that provided them livelihood
and whatever little cultivated land they had.
Background: How it
all began
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation(NHPC) started large-scale
construction activity at two sites at Kalijhora and 27th Mile on NH
31A for building of dams in 2003-2004. A project which generated
controversy since inception, TLDP means Teesta ‘Low Dam’—even when dam heights
are 32.5 and 30 metres. The globally accepted definition framed by the
International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), categories dams above 15
meters as large. One also misses the point of calling a project ‘run of the
river’ that is going to create a reservoir, impound water and submerge several
hundred hectares of forest land.
The plans for
taming the Teesta River flowing through almost the entire length of Sikkim and
then entering North Bengal, are not new. Since the 1970’s a proposal has been
in place for harnessing the river in six stages the mountainous parts of
Sikkim. Of this, only one proposal to construct a 510 MW, 96.5-m high dam in
Sikkim has come through. When the project was granted environmental clearance,
one of the conditions was that no more projects would be developed on river
Teesta in Sikkim till a carrying capacity study of the Teesta River Basin is
completed. In the case of the two TLDP dams it would have been logical to wait
for the results of the carrying capacity study mentioned above, before going
ahead with the project—since the study is looking at the same river basin on which
these projects are proposed.
TLDP-III has
already been accorded environmental clearance by the MoEF in July 2003, and TLDP-IV
not long after. The MoEF had earlier refused site clearance for the TLDP-IV on
the grounds that it would entail diversion of land within Mahananda Wild Life
Sanctuary, which necessitated slightly relocating the site.
The proposal for the so-called ‘low’ dams(TLDP) on the river Teesta
generated a lot of controversy before these were finally cleared by the
Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India (MoEF, GoI).
Environmental groups as well as hydrologists, geologists and biologists from
North Bengal and all over the country opposed the proposal on the grounds that
the Environmental Impact Assessment(EIA) process for the projects was
incomplete, non-transparent, and non-participatory, that it did not involve the
resident populations in and around the project sites, and most importantly, the
EIA either contained inadequate data on possible environmental impacts or deliberately
suppressed and falsified important scientific data on those impacts. There were
also enough instances of violations of Environmental Protection Act.
The EIA Reports and related Environmental Management Plans(EMP) for
TLDP-III and IV admitted that the hillsides around the project site were
geologically fragile, and that any tampering with the slopes might result in
severe landslides, increasing the danger of siltation in the reservoir, and
affecting the NH 31. In fact, the Geological Survey of India(GSI) Report on the
projects indicated that construction activity and damming the river might not
only re-activate dormant slides in the area, but also open new slides. Both the
GSI Report and the project EMPs prescribe elaborate slope protection measures
along the reservoir rim that stretches for more than 7 Kms. from the project
sites in both TLDP-III and IV. The said Report and Plans also prescribed
special measures for the existing slide zones along the proposed reservoir
rims. Surprisingly, the environmental clearances given to both TLDP-III and IV
ignore the geological impact aspect, as if it was taken for granted that the
project proponents would carry out the protection measures as prescribed.
A brief look at the chronology of events that marked the beginning of
TLDP-III reveals how existing environmental statutes were violated at will.
Colossal violation of the law:
Chronology of TLDP-III
Power Projects
in India need mandatory clearances from the Ministry of Environment and Forests
(MOEF), Government of India. These clearances are subject to the implementing
agency meeting all ‘statutory obligations’, which include, among other things,
an elaborate, ‘participatory’ and ‘transparent’ Environment Impact Assessment
(EIA) exercise. This process gets overseen by State Pollution Control Boards,
and ‘neutral’, accredited organisations are entrusted with the study. Teesta
Low Dam Project EIA was done by North Bengal University, and it commissioned
the Geological Survey of India, Kolkata, with the geological impact component.
We will come to that later.
On November 14,
West Bengal Pollution Control Board issued the public hearing notification(public
hearings are mandatory in all projects that require environmental and forest
clearances, according to Environment Protection Act 1986) for TLDP-III. The
notification did not mention the EIA, and says that only the Executive summary
of the Detailed Project Report (DPR) will be available for public scrutiny. If
we remember that the law demands all project related documents have to be
placed in public domain well before the date of the hearing, the illegality
starts from here: till the last week of November—10 days from the date of the
notification—the Siliguri Regional Office of the WBPCB could not show the
Executive Summary. The Executive Summary of the Project was not available in
Nepali—the major local language—till December 6, 2002, which constituted
another violation. After local groups such as NESPON (North-Eastern Society for
Preservation of Nature and Wild Life, based in Siliguri) challenged legality of the Public Hearing and
the EIA process for TLDP stage–III, NHPC—and not the WBPCB—sent a copy of the
EIA to the PCB Siliguri Regional Office on the evening of December 09, 2002,
just 10 days before the hearing and 20 days after the publication of the
Hearing notification. The EIA was available only in English. A fresh Public
hearing notification was issued on 13.12.3003, and the programme was
rescheduled for 3.1.2003. Point to remember: according to the EIA rules, a
clear 30-day period should separate the dates of notification and hearing, and,
on the date of the hearing, all relevant documents including the EIA and DPR
should be available for Public Scrutiny, in major local languages.
EIA findings distorted, suppressed
Going by the
date given on the EIA report cover, North Bengal University submitted the
‘complete’ report in August 2002. But important portions of the GSI report (the ‘Report on the
geological and geotechnical investigations’ by Geological Survey of India,
Kolkata, as part of the EIA.) were not included in the Report.
NBU submitted the ‘complete’ report in August 2002. The GSI report was
based on data collected during one full field season (2001-2002). Because there
was a period of just five months between the submission of this report and
preparation of the EIA, a similar or parallel study could not have been
conducted within this period. It becomes clear from the EIA that the GSI report
was the sole source of geological data included in it. In this context,
non-inclusion of a crucial section of the GSI report in the final EIA was inexplicable
(subsection 3.5 of the GSI report that deals with the project impacts during
the operational phase). The EIA not
only excludes this section but goes on to say (subsection 8.5) that
there will be ‘no land environment impact during the operational phase’ of the
project. The Entire Section 8 of the EIA (section titled ‘summary of
environmental impacts) contains no information on geological/geomorphologic
impacts, as if such impacts do not exist).
Some of the significant dropped/suppressed
portions from the Report:
1.Executive Summary:
a. Structure and Tectonics
‘…. It may be mentioned here
that a) neo-tectonic movements are very common for such a juvenile organic belt
like Himalayas and b) the Main Boundary Thrust (M.B.T) passes through the
reservoir of TLDHP-IV (-2.5-3 Km u/s of the proposed dam axis and has been
reported to be non-tectonically active’.
Though the ‘dam axis’
mentioned here refers to the previously proposed site, the M.B.T location is
perilously closer to the new site.
b. Landslides:
‘A number of active and
dormant landslides are present within the project area due to partly to
anthropogenic activities and partly to adverse geological condition/ slope
morphology. After impoundment, due to
the effects of changing pore water pressure within the slope wash/debris
material chances of mass movements in the form of new landslides, reactivation
of fossil/dormant slides and further destabilisation of already vulnerable
slopes cannot be ruled out. Proposed constructional activities may also cause
landslides.’
Chapter II
Site specific geological and
geo-technical parameters
Section 2.18.
‘Though NH 31 A will be at a
much higher elevation of the FRL of Stage IV dam; but in those stretches where
mudstone and clay stone will come into contact with the reservoir water,
stability of the existing road bench may become vulnerable.’
2.19
‘two active slides on the
road section are located between 7 km and 8.3 km. Both of these are
rock-cum-debris slides and their toes have reached up to the existing Tista bed
level. So to protect the toe of these slides from the erosion during high
discharge, protection in the form of retaining walls will have to be constructed
upto the FRL.’
2.20
‘Evidences indicate that the
slide at Berrik has been caused due to planar and wedge failure of intensely
jointed and sheared rock mass and perhaps initially triggered by toe erosion by
Tista. ….Further there are possibilities of instability which may be caused
by short duration high intensity rainfall in that area.’
2.21
‘The most visible active
landslides within the limit of the project area affecting the NH21A are at 8.3
km slide (Fig 8) and 7.1 km slide. Both the slides are rock-cum-debris slides,
which have been reactivated during the Monsoon period of 2001.
The slides have severely
affected the road bench of NH31A making the width of the road bench shorter.
Any further destabilisation / sliding at these locations will invariably cut
off the vital road-link.
Sufficient protection
measures, well-planned drainage networks etc. are essential at these slides
location to check further deterioration, otherwise fresh sliding would
definitely enhance supply of silt into the reservoir and cause blockage of the
river channel. Toe protection wall up to FRL level will have to be planned.’
3.0
‘AS per BIS code is
1983-1975, design seismic co-efficient (ยตh) as per seismic
coefficient method in zone IV comes around 0.1. The design of all the
appurtenant structures at both the project sites should be considered as per
the seismic consideration mentioned above. Hence it should also be kept in mind
that a) neo-tectonic movements are very common for such a juvenile organic belt
like Himalaya and b) the main boundary thrust (MBT) passes through the
reservoir of TLDHP – IV (i.e., about 2.5-3 km (u/s of the proposed dam axis)
and has been reported to be neo-tectonically active.’
3.5
‘After impoundment of the
reservoir, the water level in the reservoir area (mostly restricted within the
main Tista river valley) will rise considerably. Accordingly, the slope wash /
debris at the toe will become surcharged with water and pore pressure within it
may considerably increase. The condition may deteriorate when fluctuation in
the reservoir level takes place. As a consequence the strength parameters of
the slope mass will decrease and it may become susceptible to destabilisation.
Thus triggering of new landslides, or reactivating old/dormant slides and further
destabilisation of already active slides cannot be ruled out. The similar
conditions also prevail for TLDHP-IV and necessary precaution may have to be
taken.’
The EIA not only
excluded these portions but the Entire Section 7 of the EIA (section titled ‘
Environmental Impacts’) contained no information on geological/geomorphologic
impacts, as if such impacts did not exist!
The EIA report was full of incomplete/partial data. Some of these can be
cited:
1.Section 2, subsection 2-4: Seismicity: The EIA admitted that the site-specific
seismic design parameters were being ‘studied’ and not yet available at the
time of writing the report. Because the project area falls within the seismic
zone IV, any major construction work in this zone need to have suitable seismic
co-efficient incorporated in its design. If design parameters were unavailable,
how could NHPC talk about construction datelines (Executive summary, DPR)?
2.Section 2, subsection 2.5.2:
Reservoir Sedimentation:
Though Subsection 2.7(watershed) mentioned that out of 19
watersheds/sub-watersheds in the project area 5 have high and 3 others very
high priority status in sediment yield index, and none of the watersheds is
safe from the danger of erosion and destabilization, the subsection on reservoir
sedimentation gave no data on possible cumulative sedimentation in the
reservoir. Moreover, it arbitrarily mentioned that ‘retrogressive silt flushing
near the intakes is effective’, and ‘no separate silt exclusion arrangement has
been provided’. No further explanation or clarifications for these were
provided.
The EIA was based on data collected from a study area that extended to 7
Kilometers upstream from the project site. Thus it ignored all watersheds—and
the slope stability factor in them—beyond that point. In a river like Teesta
that flows through inherently unstable terrain and carries an average annual
load of 3-4 Metric Tonnes of silt, a 7-kilometer radius can only provide
incomplete sedimentation data.
The EIA said (2.5.2) that gross storage in the reservoir will be 18.36
Mcum at FRL 208 meters and live storage has been computed at 11.57 Mcum. Hydrological
data given in the DPR and EIA did not take into account the possible increase
of discharge and ensuing floods caused by glacial melting in the upstream. This
omission posed serious questions to the credibility of all the hydrological
computations used in the DPR and the EIA.
The EIA ignored the downstream impact factor on the pretext that because
the project was run-of-the-river and supposedly would not impede the natural
discharge of water, there would be no additional danger of floods downstream.
The fact, however, remained that the project will cause impoundment of water on
a large scale on a glacial river, in an area with perennially unstable valley
slopes and with watersheds with high sediment yield index. Moreover, this was
not really a run-of-the-river scheme as the project authorities stated, because
it involved impoundment of water and creation of an artificial reservoir.
The GSI report mentioned that construction of the reservoir and
continuous storage of water would increase pore pressure on the adjoining
slopes, leading to toe erosion and slope destabilization, all these factors would
finally affect the discharge and the sedimentation processes and might lead to
the weakening of the barrage structure, thus causing serious impacts on the
flow of the river downstream.
3. Section 2, subsections 2.6, 2.21: slope instability and soil
erosion: These subsections made it clear that road building and tampering with
slopes in the project area had already caused much damage: ‘In many cases,
roads are improperly aligned on weak and unstable rock formation increasing
their susceptibility to damage by landslide. Blasting during road making is
equivalent to mild seismic activity in the region causing landslides and
slips.’(2.6). Further, it said ‘ Water disposal arrangements are not sufficient
to cope with a rainfall of high intensity’ (2.21). In spite of these findings
the EIA gave a clean chit to the proposed construction of a total 14.5
kilometers of new roads in the area, in 10 separate stretches (Section 8,
subsection 8.5), just by saying that slope stabilization work and plantation
activities would be taken up. The report was silent about mitigating the
impacts of construction activity during road and barrage building in an area
where ‘ a minor tremor can act as a trigger and reduce the shear strength and
initiate sand and mudflows’ (2.6)?
4. The EIA report, mentioned the Environment Management Plan(EMP)
several times. The plan was not available for study before the public hearing. This
showed that the project authorities anticipated no awkward questions; perhaps
they thought that the authenticity and effectiveness of the plans was beyond
question? The EIA said that local
communities were involved in all stages of the EMPs. Community/communities in
the project area knew nothing of such EMPs, or the EIA for that matter.
At a public meeting in Siliguri in April 2002 organized jointly by NESPON
and SANDRP(South Asian Network for Dams, River and People), the then Chief
Engineer of the project openly admitted that the estimated life span of the dam
is fifty years. This, along with the concerns about Seismicity, sedimentation,
glacial lake outburst floods and landslide induced floods raised many until now
unanswered questions about the economic viability of the project.
Manipulating
Truth, and Deceiving people: TLDP-IV
In other words all portions and information
in the EIA report that could go against the Project and act as potential
hurdles in its obtaining environmental clearance had been deliberately dropped,
making the entire EIA exercise manipulative, illegal, potentially deceptive and
against public interest.
The same disregard for accountability and
transparency accompanied the EIA process of TLDP-IV. The EIA in this case too
was based on the same GSI report, and in the similar manner only an edited
version was presented.
The GSI report made it abundantly clear that
the project would have severe impacts on the project area; the all-important
road link NH31/31A might be permanently damaged with dangers of soil erosion
and landslides increasing, and faults including the main Boundary Fault
touching and passing through the reservoir area, there would always be dangers
of earthquakes. Because of such earthquakes, landslides and other factors like
cloudburst, more rainfall and glacial lake bursts in the upstream the dam might
leak, or burst, thus endangering the entire downstream population in the Teesta
basin.
These were facts of which the people in the
project area and in the larger Teesta basin area should have been made aware,
so that they could take informed decision about the Dam, and these were facts
which the public hearings should have discussed.
TLDP-IV EIA:
Full of inaccuracies, half-truths, omissions
The TLDP-IV EIA was equally full of
incomplete/partial data. Some of these are:
1.Section 3,
subsection 3-8: Seismicity:
The EIA admitted that the site-specific
seismic design parameters were being ‘studied’ through IIT, Roorkee and not yet
available. Because the Project area falls within the seismic zone IV, any major
construction work in this zone need to have suitable seismic co-efficient
incorporated in its design. If design parameters were unavailable, how could
the NHPC authorities talk about construction datelines (Executive summary,
DPR)?
Surprisingly enough the EMP for TLDP-IV said
that seismic design parameters were available, but did not incorporate
information on that.
The project area falls within the seismic
zone IV on BIS map. In his written objections to the TLDP-IV EIA, Debashis
Chatterjee, a renowned geologist, and ex-Director, GSI, Eastern Region pointed
out that in the case of the Teesta, extra caution had to be exercised, because
the river has an extremely high net gradient, and occupies a tectonic feature
transverse to the Himalayan structural grain. This transverse feature lies
along the extension of the Jamuna shear fault (along the western edge of the
Meghalaya plateau), which has been identified as a major fault zone in eastern
India. Dam construction along the fault zone may give rise to Reservoir Induced
Seismicity. His objection note further said that at least eight earthquake
events of magnitude larger than Mb 6.0 were known to have occurred between 1897
and 1990 in the "in the vicinity of this area" as per GSI report, and
also the EIA (Table 3.12).
2.Section 3,
subsections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3: Watershed
and Sedimentation:
The Subsection 3.3.2 (watershed) mentioned
that more than 60 % of the total watersheds/sub-watershed area in the have high
and very high priority status in sediment yield index, and none of the
watersheds is safe from the danger of erosion and destabilization. Despite
saying that ‘the initial sediment deposition rate shall be very high depending
upon the sediment load generated upstream’ (sedimentation 3.3.3) the EIA carried
no further data on possible cumulative sedimentation in the reservoir.
Moreover, it casually mentioned that ‘the spillway crest..at 157m.This would
ensure that sediment accumulation near the dam would not exceed beyond the
spillway crest..’: No further explanation or clarifications provided.
3.Hydrology:
The EIA said (3.3.3) that gross storage in
the reservoir would be 36.63 MCM at FRL 182.25meters and live storage had been
computed at 7.91 MCM. Beyond these, the EIA gave no hydrological data, and did
not explain how these figures were obtained. The storage figures given in the
DPR and EIA apparently did not take into account the possible increase of
discharge and ensuing floods caused by glacial melting in the upstream.
The heavy concentration of rainfall within a
short period is common in Eastern Himalaya. The dam-managers would be compelled
to release water at the peak of monsoon and that would inevitably cause flash
floods in the lower reaches. Information on glacial behaviour and its impacts
was therefore necessary to analyse the impacts on downstream populations and
the environment.
4. Flora and Fauna:
The EIA mentioned at least 7 rare and
threatened plant species (4.4.7) in the study area, but said that there would
be no significant impact on the plant communities, because the area under
submergence harbours no such species. Apparently the EIA ignored the fact, that
the impact would not be limited to the actual submergence area, and plant
communities all along the Catchment area and the river gorge would be further
exposed to additional anthropogenic interventions, and increased ecological
instability induced by soil erosion, soil degradation and dust accumulation
during both the construction and operation phases.
The project submerged 338.05 hectares of
forest land rich in biodiversity.
The EIA/EMP mentioned impacts on Fish
migration (10.6/EMP), but beyond suggesting a fish ladder, did not clarify how
this impact would be mitigated. Among the fish species likely to be affected by
the dam, there would be endangered Himalayan species like Tor Tor and Tor
PuiTar.
The hoax of
environmental management
The EMP listed engineering and biological
measures as part of the proposed Catchment Area Treatment (CAT) Plan. Judging
by the magnitude and the intensity of the problem, the proposed measures were
pitifully inadequate. The EMP budget on this head allotted just Rs. 1600 per
hectare (Table 5.7/B in the EMP) distributed over several years for proposed
engineering measures in 11740 hectares of areas ‘under very severe and severe
erosion category in priority sub watersheds’ (5.4.1/Table 5.6 in the EMP ).
All these meant that sedimentation would not
be halted, and the river as well as the reservoir would have a perpetually
increasing silt load. In a river like Teesta the silt would be mixed with
rocks, boulders, and trees. This load would likely be trapped upstream of the
dams and the reservoir is likely to be choked in no distant period.
As part of Reservoir Rim Treatment, the EMP
listed several engineering measures to tackle landslips/landslides. While the
GSI report recommended ‘toe protection wall upto FRL level’ all along the
affected stretches, the EMP suggested only 500 CuM of toe Protection wall in
each Slide area, with another 500 CuM of retaining wall.
Even for a pre-dam situation, these measures were
inadequate and could not be expected to ensure sustained slope stability. With
dangers for toe-erosion and slope destabilization increased manifold in the
post-reservoir situation, how can one reasonably expect that 500 CuMs of RCC
walls would be effective in slides covering several hectares of severely degraded
and unstable land? It should have been kept in mind that blasting and slope
modification during the construction of dams would obviously invite further
landslides, threatening life and livelihood of the people.
The project would generate 20,67,500 cuM of
muck. The EMP, beyond saying that 6.75 hectares of downstream area (in two
plots, 750m, and 250m downstream of the project site) would be used for muck
storage, and these areas would be later restored through plantation, remains
extremely vague on what measures would be taken to prevent spill over of muck
into the riverbed, especially during the three-four months of monsoon.
This meant that lager parts of the muck would
flow into the river, increasing the threat to the ambient water quality, and
polluting the river beyond redemption.
Participatory EIA?
The EIA said that local communities and NGOs
were involved in all stages of the EIA process. However, such communities/NGOs
were never found, neither the methodology adopted for such participatory
exercises. NHPC and WBPCB failed to furnish a list of
people/organizations/institutions involved in this exercise.
The EIA/EMP showed only 11 families in
Kalijhora Bazaar as project affected. But the reality is all the people in the
Catchment area (25,000+ families, and especially 12700+ families residing in
the Right Banks of Teesta—the EIA, 6.7.2, table 6.4) would be affected by the
project that would cause severe damage to the sole road link of the area
NH31/31A, and adversely impact on the overall geomorphology of the catchment
area. Close proximity to the Dam site makes another 300+ families in 5
Downstream Villages along the NH31 also extremely vulnerable to flash floods
and soil erosion.
This meant that the project might affect the
livelihood and homes of all these people, and what use an Environment
Management Plan and Relief and Rehabilitation plan that did not address these
concerns are incomplete and inadequate.
The Farce of Public Hearing
Despite protests by NGOs, community organizations and concerned
individuals, public hearings for both TLDP-III and IV were held more or less
according to schedule: the first
in a village called Deorali, way above the dam site, and the second one
in Kalijhora Bazaar.
Nothing could have been more farcical than the so-called ‘Hearings’. A
large number of people from the project affected villages and adjoining areas
attended the TLDP-III hearing, but they had neither any information about the
project nor any idea about the EIA. In spite of a mass petition (signed by 84
community representatives present at the Hearing venue) demanding postponement
of the process till the EIA report was available in local language, and
objections by NESPON citing illegality of the exercise, the Hearing was
conducted.
The hearing opened with a lengthy speech from the NHPC representative in
praise of the project. After that, two panel members called upon the
participants to not to oppose the project! In course of the Hearing the Chief
Engineer of WBPCB admitted that that they could not make the necessary
documents available during the first notification (14.11.2002) and apologized
for it! He evaded the complaint that complete project documents were not
available even at the time of the subsequent notification (13.12.2002), and
moreover, the second notification did not give a fresh 30-day period for filing
objections. Neither the WBPCB nor NHPC representatives could clarify why the
EIA report excluded the findings of the GSI (refer to our letter dated
12.12.2002).
Demands raised by the local people included inclusion of all villages in
the project area in the RR plan as 'project affected villages', and that the
rehabilitation process was completed much before the actual commencement of the
project work. More interestingly, people demanded that NHPC should enter into a
legal agreement with the villagers, guaranteeing the bridge over Teesta and
other amenities they were talking about (some villagers in fact brought and
submitted an typed out and well-drafted agreement on court paper).
In the public hearing for TLDP-IV held in September 2004, project
authorities and political parties supporting the dam ensured that truckloads of
outsiders, many of them known ruffians, were visible in the venue: this author
was not allowed to complete his submission, a representative of a Siliguri NGO
was assaulted by the local Panchayat member belonging to a political party on
the dias while opposing the project in his submission, and the chairperson of
the panel kept on blatantly supporting the project. Because of adverse
submissions by many, the hearing went on till late evening; and this author
found himself surrounded by a group of hoodlums towards conclusion: it was a
miracle that he escaped unhurt.
NHPC reportedly its ‘community development funds’ to kill possible
protests: in fact, in Kalijhora, an anti-dam protest by local youth was
engineered in 2002, immediately after the NESPON-SANDRP meeting was held, and 4
years before actual project work would start. The leaders of this ‘movement’,
in which some of the local NGOs participated, were all generously compensated.
NHPC allegedly made similar ‘arrangements’ with other NGOs who later raised
objections during the hearing.
In TLDP-III,
visible public anger and dissent failed to ventilate, the then local councillor
of Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, and the most influential politician of the
area kept on threatening people with ‘dire consequences’ each time a protest
meeting took place. The same coercive practice continues to this day.
Environment,
livelihood in danger: construction
of dams and the aftermath
Construction work at TLDP-III
site below 27th Mile started in 2004, and at TLDP-IV at Kalijhora,
in 2006. A Monitoring Committee(the stipulation was in the environmental
clearance) was constituted for TLDP-III on 31.05.2005. In both sites, the
natural flow of the river was blocked, and the river was forced to pass through
narrow diversion channels. Dynamite was used rampantly at TLDP-III sites, and the slopes on both
banks of the river—along NH 31A near 27th Mile, and Nazeok forest
village—were entirely denuded of existing vegetation cover. At TLDP-IV site at
Kalijhora, slopes on the left bank (downstream) were similarly affected. No
slope protection activity at the dam sites, (and along the reservoir rims, and
potential slide zones) was undertaken, at least not until
half the roadside caved in August 2006 in a new slide just above the
TLDP-III site at 27th Mile. Even then, only temporary guard walls
have been erected to halt the slide only at that particular site, and all other
areas have been left unprotected.
The six-monthly Progress Reports on environmental compliance (for
TLDP-III) NHPC has been submitting to the MoEF according to one of the
clearance conditions show that important environmental issues have been left
unaddressed while the construction work proceeded in full swing. The EIA/EMPs
for both the projects mentioned that because many of the watersheds and
sub-watersheds in the project area were erosion-prone and had high
sediment-yield index, catchment-protection work in form of improved drainage,
new plantations and guard walls was an environmental priority. However, as the
last available six-monthly Progress Report shows, nothing has been done so far
for catchment-protection.
The Progress Reports do not include any information on reservoir rim
protection work.
The Reports mention that a committee has been formed to expedite Relief
and Rehabilitation(R&R) work, and that the committee has had several
discussions with community members and affected people. The reality, however,
is that as off now, nobody in two roadside forest hamlets of 29th
Mile and Geilkhola has agreed to the compensation terms, and many raise
questions about why the guard walls promised by NHPC are not coming up.
The Flood on 27th July,2007
Torrential rains continuing for days resulted in the so-called flood on
27th July, when a swollen and angry Teesta tore through the paltry
embankments, and came back to its original channels at both TLDP-III and IV
sites, submerging the entire worksites at both places. Heavy dredgers and
makeshift construction workers’ shanties were swept away alike, and workers
have to be rescued at Kalijhora. Unconfirmed Reports suggest some casualties at
27th Mile, but that could not be verified.
A similar incident,but on a smaller scale, occurred on 17th
July, when the river first breached the Kalijhora embankments.
Landslides
At least 14 new landslides, big and small, opened up between Kalijhora
and 29th Mile, on both banks of Teesta. The 27th Mile
slide is still active, and the guard walls look inadequate. The Slide starts
from NH31A, and goes straight to the TLDP-III site. A new and huge slide has
opened within 2 kms of the TLDP-III site, affecting the road. Between TLDP-III
and IV, a new slide has opened on the right bank(downstream), and yet another
on the left, near the old Berrick Slide. The new road that NHPC built to
TLDP-III site was caving in. Lateral cracks could be seen in the sandy soil of
the entire slope. No slope protection work was visible along the road. All old slides have worsened and more slides
have opened up on NH 31A since the disastrous earthquake in Sikkim and
sub-Himalayan North Bengal on September 18, 2011.
Villages face displacement from
landslide: Karmatt, 29th Mile and Geilkhola
While 29th Mile and Geilkhola are roadside forest villages
shown as project affected villages in the DPR(Detailed Project Report) EIA,
Karmatt is a forest village now facing destruction by impending landslides
aggravated by TLDP-IV construction work just below the village. The 29th
Mile, Geilkhola and the Ryiang(located just below the TLDP-III dam) villages
face certain displacement, judging by the high water mark on the Tessta gorge
walls placed by NHPC, and now, the steadily rising level of the reservoir in
TLDP-III. The NH 31A, the arterial road
connecting India with China through Sikkim has started caving in several places
all along the stretch from Sevoke Coronation Bridge to Teesta Bazaar, even
before the dams were commissioned. In a surprising development, the GREF under
the Ministry of Defence has begun constructing a re-aligned road from the
TLDP-III site at 27th Mile to Teesta Bazaar.
The Gramsabha of 29th mile Forest Village has passed resolutions
to the effect that the dam-building activities by NHPC
in the 27th Mile TLDP Stage-III are in direct violation of the Forest
Rights Act: “it impinges upon our constitutional rights to live, cultivate and
otherwise use the forest land in which we have been living for nearly a century
now’, the Resolution says, ‘NHPC activities pose a direct threat to our village
in total violation of the project holder’s commitments as expressed in the EIA
and the EMP for the project: while both documents mentioned that only the
low-lying river bed areas of our village would be affected, the project in fact
affects the entire village at present. We find that the water level in the
TLDP-III reservoir will reach the present level of NH 31A and beyond, hence
putting our village in great danger of submergence, soil erosion and fresh
landslides.
... the
re-alignment of the NH 31A has been affecting our village both ecologically and
economically—the road construction has been affecting forests under our Gram
Sabha—forest trees had been illegally felled without first seeking and
obtaining any permission by the Gram Sabha, and thus the forest clearance for
this has apparently been obtained under false premises. The re-alignment will
also destroy our livelihoods as the present NH 31A is our economic lifeline.
‘By virtue of... powers vested...by the Section 5 of
the FRA’, the Gram Sabha decided that ‘as both the TLDP-III and the
re-alignment of NH 31A directly affect our cultural and natural heritage and
obstruct us in discharging our duties as prescribed in the FRA 2006, such
activities must stop until the issue is amicably settled. To our utter dismay
we find that work in both areas have been going on, in total disregard and
utter violation of the laws of the land”.
Erosion
For the first time in recent years, Teesta has started eroding its left
bank forests and agricultural fields near Mongpong this year, in addition to
the right bank, where erosion continues. The Irrigation Department Spur on the
right bank was gone, affecting Chumukdangi
Village
All villages between Sevoke and Gazaldoba Barrage further downstream are
in danger from Teesta erosion, and flooding. Teesta keeps on changing its
course even beyond Gazaldoba, and the river has come back near Jalpiguri Town
In a petition submitted to the WBFFCE(West
Bengal Fact Finding Commission on Environment--non-official, chaired by Justice
Bhabbati Prasad Bannerjee) in Siliguri on October 12, 2012, community
representatives from TLDP area raised following questions:
1. Why did NHPC start construction without taking adequate safeguards?
How could the work at TLDP-III continue without first assuring that all
existing slides and vulnerable slopes are protected, especially after last
years slide at 27th Mile?
2. Why did NHPC not start the ‘rim protection’ measures as prescribed in
the EMPs? Is it for the reason that the Project does not have sufficient funds
to cover the costs? Already, the ‘catchment area treatment’ has been delayed for
TLDP-III because the project does not have the budget to cover the costs quoted
by West Bengal and Silkkim Forest Departments.
3. The TLDP-III progress Report say that compensation amount for the
affected families have been arrived at through discussions. However, several
families have not accepted compensation so far, and more than the compensation
they want from NHPC the guarantee that nothing wouldl happen to their village,
and the road on which their livelihood depends.
The petitioners demanded ‘urgent and time-bound redress’ in the
following:
A. Complete land-for-land rehabilitation in suitable locations and
adequate cash compensation for all the bonafide residents of Geilkhola, 29th
Mile and Karmatt from NHPC and the Government of West Bengal.
B. No further construction work in both project sites till NHPC
adequately complies with the EMP for TLDP-III and IV, particularly at TLDP-III,
in accordance with the Forest Rights Act, 2006 and the 29th Mile
Gram Sabha Resolution.
C. Adequate and proper restoration
of the NH 31A by NHPC. NHPC must ensure rim-protection measures, and watershed
conservation work as detailed in the EMPs.
In lieu of conclusion: excerpts from proceedings of hearing of WBFFCE, October 12,2012
;…Smt Meena Sherpa on behalf of 29th Mile Forest Village Gram
Sabha moved the petition mentioning thereto about the disastrous condition of
the village area surrounding Teesta Low Dam Project. Main Contention of the
petition that all villages between Sevak and Gazoldoba barrage further
downstream are in great danger from Teesta erosion and other calamities arising
from the Teesta Dam construction. It is also mentioned that Teesta river is
changing its course even beyond Gazoldoba and there is a chance for affecting
Jalpaiguri town also. It is categorically mentioned in the petition that NHPC
is continuing their work violating the condition of the EIA clearance for their
project. Petitioner also mentioned that compensation process of NHPC is faulty
and large number of people are not getting any compensation though there
property had been badly affected due to the construction of the dam and also
affect their existence in their homeland.
Considering the entire situation,
we are in view that the entire copy of the petition should be forwarded immediately
to the NHPC for their attention and for obtaining remedial measures. State
Disaster Management Dept. should also be kept informed about this situation by
which the petitioners may get justice immediately...…After going through the
papers and taking to the consideration of the submission we are in view that
during preparation of the EIA report precautionary measures are not considered.
We are inviting attention of the government that sustainable development is now
the key issue of the development process wherein “precautionary principles”
need to be followed otherwise during the course of development, mostly poor
people or downtrodden people face the music of disaster. In this instant case
downtrodden people of the locality have been badly affected(italics added)…’
According to the residents of 29th Mile and Geilkhola, who
now live in constant fear of drowning ever since the dam started to feel, the
local administration(here the BDO of Kalimpong) told them that NHPC is
‘considering’ some relief for the affected. However, because the villages do
not have tenural entitlements as yet--despite clear provision in Forest Rights
Act—the administration and the forest department treat these settlements as
‘encroachments’.
People from 24 forest villages in the Teesta Valley likely to be
affected by TLDP projects and a proposed
railway line to Sikkim recently formed a new Testa Sangharsh
Samittee(TSS) to press their demands. Not much could be achieved, though: NHPC
remains non-responsive as ever, and the ruling political party in the
Darjeeling hills apparently shares the administration’s view that these are
encroached villages and hence cannot demand compensation legally. It was heard
that party bosses told community representatives to wait till the water rises to
their homes; later, another leader ‘promised’ a ‘shifting within one month’.
Movements are bad, people were told, unless the party permits it. Because the
party resents ‘outside’ and ‘plainspeople’s’ interference in hill matters(this
became manifest, with ugly communal overtones after WBFCCE members visited TLDP
sites on October 13,2012), this author and his colleagues in NESPON could no
longer go and talk to the people freely and without fear. Meanwhile, sensing
that its violations crossed all acceptable limits, and might result in a
litigation soon, NHPC authorities are reported trying hectic damage control:
which usually translates into lobbying with the ruling party, and offering
meager and random compensation to a handful of people.
Justice continues to elude the people of the Teesta valley.
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